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Q30We estimate the impact of local mining activity on the business constraints experienced by 25,777 firms across
nine large and resource-rich countries. We find that the presence of active mines in firms' immediate vicinity
(b20 km) deteriorates the business environment in tradeable sectors. Access to inputs and infrastructure
becomes more constrained for these firms and this adversely affects their growth. In contrast, nearby active
mines have a positive effect on firms in non-tradeable sectors. Moreover, we show that the presence of mines
at a greater distance (21–150 km) relaxes business constraints of all firms, in linewith positive regional spending
effects.





The last two decades have witnessed an extraordinary expansion in
global mining activity. A surge in commodity demand from industrializ-
ing countries pushed up the price of metals and minerals. This in turn
led to substantial new mining investment, an increasing share of
which is concentrated in emerging markets (Humphreys, 2010). This
geographical shift reflects that many American and European mineral
deposits have by now been depleted and that the long-distance trans-
port of minerals by sea has become less costly. As a result, the world's
largest mines can nowadays be found in Africa, Asia and Latin America.ven.poelhekke@auckland.ac.nz
t of Economics, Owen G. Glenn
o affiliatedwith CESifo, Munich.Theminingboomhas also reinvigorated thedebate about the impact
of mining on economic activity and welfare. Some regard mines simply
as stand-alone enclaves without a notable local impact (Hirschman,
1958). Others point to the potentially negative consequences of natural
resource dependence such as real exchange rate appreciation, economic
volatility, deindustrialization and corruption (see van der Ploeg (2011)
for a comprehensive survey). Mines can also pollute and threaten the
livelihoods of local food producers. They often require vast amounts of
water, electricity, labor and infrastructure, for which they may compete
with local manufacturers. Yet others stress the potential for positive
spillovers to firms and households as mining operators may buy local
inputs and hire local employees.3 Local wealth can also increase if gov-
ernments use taxable mining profits to invest in regional infrastructure
or to make transfers to the local population.
Our paper informs this debate by estimating the impact of active
mines on firms across nine countries with large mining sectors: Brazil,3 For example, Wright and Czelusta (2007) argue that “linkages and complementarities
to the resource sector were vital in the broader story of American economic success”.
5 Countries tax mining revenues through a combination of standard corporate
tax, a mining (royalty) tax, and export fees. While these taxes are typically col-
lected by the central government, a substantial portion of them are either
redistributed back to the mining regions or used by the central government to
fund infrastructure and other projects in those regions. For instance, the
Brazilian constitution stipulates that states and federal districts are assured a
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Our detailed data allow us to get around the endogeneity issues that
plague country-level studies as well as the limitations to external valid-
ity of well-identified country-specific papers. Our empirical analysis is
motivated by the “Dutch disease” model of Corden and Neary (1982)
which sets out how a resource boom drives up wage costs for firms
in the traded (manufacturing) sector as they compete for labor
with firms in the resource and non-traded sectors. We hypothesize
that mining companies and manufacturing firms also compete for
other inelastically supplied inputs and public goods—such as transport
infrastructure and electricity—and that this hurts tradeable-sector
firms, which are price takers on world markets.
We test this hypothesis using three main data sets. First, we use de-
tailed data on 25,777 firms from the EBRD-World Bank Business Envi-
ronment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS) and the World
Bank Enterprise Survey. These data contain the responses of firm man-
agers to questions on the severity of various constraints to the operation
and growth of their business, including access to transport infrastruc-
ture, electricity, land, educated workers and finance. A growing litera-
ture uses such survey data to gauge whether access to public goods
affects firm performance.4 Firms' perceptions of the importance of ex-
ternal constraints on their activity can be used to find out which con-
straints affect economic activity the most (Carlin et al., 2010). These
constraint variables measure competition for public goods directly, as
they reflect firms' intended rather than actual use of such goods, and
can therefore be interpreted as the shadow prices of public inputs. We
exploit variation across firms in the reported severity of external con-
straints to assess how local mining activity, by affecting the quality
and quantity of public good provision, influences the ability of local
firms to grow.
Second, we use comprehensive firm-level panel data from Orbis.
While Orbis does not include information on business constraints as
perceived by firms, it does contain data on the balance sheets and profit
and loss accounts of over 100,000 firms for on average five years. This
allows us to measure the impact of mining by comparing one and the
same firm before and after one or more mines open in its direct or
wider vicinity.
Third, we use the proprietary SNL Metals & Mining data set, which
contains comprehensive information on the geographical location, op-
erating status and production data for individual mines. We identify
the latitude and longitude of 5595mines producing 31 different metals
andminerals in our country sample. Depending on the year, we observe
the operating status of between 1828 and 2511 mines.
Merging firm and mine data allows us to paint a precise and time-
varying picture of the mines that open, operate and close around each
firm. Since local mining activity is plausibly exogenous to the perfor-
mance of individual firms—as it largely depends on local geology and
world mineral prices—we can identify the impact of mining on local
business constraints and firm performance. To the best of our knowl-
edge, ours is the first paper to estimate this impact of mining activity
on firm performance and to do so across a variety of countries.
Two core results emerge from our analysis, both consistent with a
sub-national version of the seminal Corden and Neary (1982) model.
First, in line with a “factor reallocation effect”, we uncover heteroge-
neous mining impacts in the immediate vicinity (≤ 20 km) of active
mines that depend on whether a firm produces tradeable or non-
tradeable goods. Only producers of tradeables that are close to active
mines report tighter business constraints (as compared with similar
firms that are not close to mines). These firms are especially hampered
in their ability to access transport infrastructure and educated workers.4 See, for instance, Commander and Svejnar (2011) and Gorodnichenko and Schnitzer
(2013). Appendix B contains the questions we use in this paper and www.
enterprisesurveys.org provides additional background information. The surveys also pro-
vide a rich array of firm covariates, such as industry, age, sales, employment, and owner-
ship structure.Importantly, mining-induced business constraints have real effects in
terms of total employment. Our results indicate that moving a producer
of tradeables from an area without mines to an area with average min-
ing intensity (2.7 mines) would reduce the number of employees by
2.2%. In contrast to firms in tradeable sectors, we find that nearby min-
ing activity alleviates business constraints for firms in non-tradable
sectors.
Second, in line with a sub-national “spending effect” we find
that both tradeable and non-tradeable firms report an improve-
ment in the provision of public goods if mining activity increases
in a distance band of between 20 and 150 km around firms. This
indicates that while mines can cause infrastructure bottlenecks
in their immediate vicinity and crowd out other firms, they may
improve transport infrastructure and other aspects of the business
environment on a wider geographical scale. Such improvements
may either reflect increased government spending or infrastruc-
ture investment by mining companies themselves.5 Two exam-
ples, both based on mines in our data set, can illustrate how
mining can improve regional infrastructure. In Chile, starting up
the Escondida copper mine required large investments in the
local power supply. These investments reduced the cost of
power in the wider Antofagasta region as well. Moreover, new
roads were constructed between the mine and the Antofagasta re-
gion that were open for public use and hence reduced regional
transport constraints (McPhail, 2009). In Indonesia, new roads
were built when the Minahasa Raya gold mine was commissioned
in 1994. These roads improved regional connectivity by better
linking the mining area to Manado, the nearest regional capital.
The resulting reduction in travel time had a positive effect on
the local economy (Mamonto et al., 2012).
Our baseline results are based on regression specifications that in-
clude region-sector-year fixed effects so that we effectively compare—
within one and the same region, sector, and year—firms with and with-
out nearby mines. In robustness tests, we experiment with different
ways to cluster our standard errors, assess the sensitivity of our results
to excluding individual countries, and control for oil and gas fields.
None of this affects the main results.
This paper contributes to a growing literature on the economic
impact of natural resource abundance. Early contributions point to
a negative cross-country correlation between resource exports
and long-term economic growth (Sachs and Warner, 1997 and
Auty, 2001). Various mechanisms have been proposed for why
resource-rich countries appear unable to convert natural re-
sources into productive assets. These include an appreciation of
the real exchange rate which turns non-resource exports uncom-
petitive (the Dutch disease); worsening institutions and gover-
nance (Besley and Persson, 2010; Dell, 2010); rent seeking
(Mehlum et al., 2006; Beck and Laeven, 2006) and increased con-
flict (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004; Miguel et al., 2004). The cross-
country evidence remains mixed—reflecting thorny endogeneity
issues—and the very existence of a resource curse continues to
be heavily debated (van der Ploeg and Poelhekke, 2010; James,
2015).“share in the results” of mineral resource exploitation in their respective territory
(Otto, 2006). Alternatively, countries can give tax breaks to mining companies in
return for investments in regional infrastructure that is open to other users. As
an example, in 2014 the Government of Guinea gave mining multinational Rio
Tinto a tax rebate in return for the construction of a highway, open to third
parties, as part of the development of the Simandou iron ore mine (Collier and
Laroche, 2015).
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timate the impact of natural resource discoveries on local living
standards.6Aragón and Rud (2013) show how the Yanacocha gold
mine in Peru improved incomes and consumption of nearby house-
holds. Their findings indicate that mining can have positive local equi-
librium effects if backward linkages are strong enough.7Lippert (2014)
and Loayza and Rigolini (2016) also document positive impacts on liv-
ing standards for Zambia and Peru, respectively. For the case of Ghana,
Fafchamps, Koelle and Shilpi (2017) find that goldmining has led to ag-
glomeration effects that benefit non-farm activities.8 Consistent with
these country studies, Von der Goltz and Barnwall (2019) show for a
sample of developing countries that mining boosts local wealth but
often comes at the cost of pollution and negative health impacts.
We contribute to this nascent literature in two ways. First, we shift
the focus fromhouseholds to firms to gain insights into themechanisms
through which mining affects local economic activity (and ultimately
household incomes).9 We not only observe firm outcomes but also the
mechanisms through which mining activity hampers some sectors but
benefits others. Second, using harmonized micro data from a diverse
set of countries with large mining and manufacturing sectors adds to
the internal as well as external validity of our results.
Our paper also relates to a small parallel literature on local oil and
gas booms in the United States. Michaels (2011) and Allcott and
Keniston (2018) show that historical hydrocarbon booms benefited
county-level economic growth through positive agglomeration effects,
backward and forward linkages, and lower transport costs.10 In contrast,
find that the US oil and gas boom of the 1970s led to negative long-term
income effects. They suggest that contrary to booms in themore distant
past (as studied byMichaels, 2011) the persistent negative effects of the
1970s boomoffset any long-term positive agglomeration effects.We as-
sess whether our results are sensitive to the presence of oil and gas pro-
duction by extending our regressions with the number of oil and gas
fields (if any) around each firm.
We also contribute to work on the relationship between the busi-
ness environment and firm performance. This literature has moved
from using country-level proxies for the business environment
(Kaufmann, 2002) to firm-level, survey-based indicators of business
constraints. Dethier et al. (2011) point to the typically strong correlation
between firms' subjective assessments of the severity of business con-
straints and more objective indicators. For instance, Pierre and
Scarpetta (2004) show that in countries with strict labor regulations
there is a higher share of firms that report labor regulations as a prob-
lem. While various papers find negative correlations between firm-
level indicators of business constraints and firm performance,
endogeneity concerns linger.11Commander and Svejnar (2011) link6 See Cust and Poelhekke (2015) for a survey. Others estimate impacts on health and
behavioral outcomes such as infant mortality (Benshaul-Tolonen, 2019) and risky sexual
behavior (Wilson, 2012). Sub-national data have also been used to reassess claims based
on cross-country data, such as that natural resources cause armed conflict and violence
(Dube and Vargas, 2013; Arezki et al., 2015; Berman et al., 2017).
7 Backward linkages exist if mines purchase local inputs like food, transportation ser-
vices and raw materials. Forward linkages include the downstream processing of mineral
ores such as smelting and refining.
8 Aragón and Rud (2016) show the flipside of Ghanaian gold mining: increased pollu-
tion, lower agricultural productivity andmore childmalnutrition and respiratory diseases.
9 Glaeser et al. (2015) showhowproximity tomining deposits led US cities to specialize
in scaleable activities, such as steel production, at the cost of fewer start-ups. This negative
impact on local entrepreneurship can become entrenched if entrepreneurial skills and at-
titudes are transmitted across generations (Chinitz, 1961).
10 Caselli and Michaels (2013) show that revenue windfalls from Brazilian offshore oil
wells (where backward and forward linkages are less likely) led tomoremunicipal spend-
ing but not to improved living standards. Brollo et al. (2013) show that thismay reflect an
increase in windfall-induced corruption and a decline in the quality of local politicians.
Likewise, Asher and Novosad (2018) show howmining booms in India result in the elec-
tion of criminal politicians.
11 For instance, Johnson et al. (2002); Beck et al. (2005); Dollar et al. (2006); Hallward-
Driemeier et al. (2006) and Bah and Fang (2015). Some papers use industry or city aver-
ages of business constraints as either regressors or instruments to reduce endogeneity
concerns.firm performance in 26 transition countries to firms' own assessments
of aspects of the business environment. They conclude that once coun-
try fixed effects are included, firms' perceptions of business constraints
add little explanatory power. Our contribution is to use exogenous
shocks that stem from the opening of large-scale mines to helpmitigate
the endogeneity concerns that continue to plague this literature.
Another related literature investigates the negative externalities
(congestion) and positive externalities (agglomeration) of geographi-
cally concentrated economic activity.12 Congestion occurs when firms
compete for a limited supply of infrastructure or other public goods.13
Agglomeration effects emerge when spatially proximate firms benefit
from deeper local labor markets, the better availability of services and
intermediate goods, and knowledge spillovers (Marshall, 1920). In
line with agglomeration benefits, Greenstone et al. (2010) show that
USfirms close to new large plants experience positive productivity spill-
overs. We assess whether newly opened mines mainly lead to positive
agglomeration or negative congestion effects for nearby and more dis-
tant firms.
Lastly, this paper also speaks to recent work on the impact of (exog-
enous) local labor supply shocks, in the form of immigration, on special-
ization across sectors. Hong andMcLaren (2015) show theoretically and
empirically (for the U.S.) how positive immigration shocks not only
increase local labor supply but also the local demand for non-traded ser-
vices. This raises real wages through entry and leads to more employ-
ment in the non-tradeables sector (Brezis and Krugman (1996)
provide a similar theoretical framework). Relatedly, Peters (2017)
uses a two-sector (agriculture and manufacturing) general equilibrium
model to guide his analysis of the local impact of ethnic Germans
migrating to Germany after WWII. He shows how migrant inflows, by
increasing the size of local markets and related agglomeration effects,
can encourage firm entry. The two main mechanisms that we consider
when assessing the local impact of mining activity are closely related
to this literature. First, while the above papers analyze a positive labor
supply shock, the opening of mines can drive up wages and attract
workers from other sectors, which is a negative labor supply shock
from the perspective of those sectors (the factor reallocation effect).
Second, the profits from natural resources, and the higher wages and/
or the increase in the local population due to immigration, can increase
the local demand for non-tradeables (the spending effect).
We proceed as follows. Section2 derives our main hypotheses based
on a structured discussion of related theoretical literature. Sections 3
and 4 then describe our data and empirical strategy, after which
Section5 presents our results. Section6 concludes.
2. Hypothesis development
While Dutch disease models initially focused on reallocation be-
tween sectors at the national level—Corden and Neary (1982) and Van
Wijnbergen (1984)—they have recently been adapted to include multi-
ple regionswithin a country (Allcott and Keniston, 2018). Suchmultire-
gional models provide a useful theoretical framework to build intuition
on howmining booms affect local as well as more distant firms in both
tradeable and non-tradeable sectors.
More specifically, we can consider a multiregional economy in
which labor is (imperfectly) mobile and where the government redis-
tributes natural resource rents between regions. For our purposes it is
instructive to think about an economy with three sectors: (i) the12 See Combes and Gobillon (2015) for a survey of the agglomeration literature.
13 A recent literature investigates the spatial impact of infrastructure on economic activ-
ity. Donaldson (2018) shows how new railways in colonial India integrated regions and
boosted welfare gains from trade. In a similar vein, Bonfatti and Poelhekke (2017) show
how purpose-built mining infrastructure across Africa determined long-term trading pat-
terns between countries. In China, the construction of trunk roads and railways reinforced
the concentration of economic activity and increased economic output (Faber, 2014 and
Banerjee et al., 2012). In the United States, Chandra and Thompson (2000) and Michaels
(2008) exploit the construction of interstates to document agglomeration effects.
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tionally and across regions; (ii) services, which are non-tradeable across
regions; and (iii) the tradeable natural resource sector. In such a set-up,
the prices of manufacturing goods and minerals are set on world mar-
kets while those of non-traded services are endogenous and vary by
region.
Labor input can be assumed to beused in afixed proportion to public
goods, such as infrastructure. A higher demand for labor then translates
into a higher demand for public goods aswell. Such public goods are not
mobile across regions, exogenously provided by a higher layer of gov-
ernment, and increasing in national natural resource rents. Typically,
the supply of public goods does not endogenously adjust to higher
shadow prices for their use. For example, increased congestion on rail
and roads will drive up delays and transportation costs, but it is up
to the (national) government to invest more in these public goods
(which are non-excludable but rivalrous in consumption). This means
that congestion of public goods and competition for private inputs can
show up as higher self-reported business constraints when firms intend
to use more of these inputs but cannot do so due to congestion or be-
cause the cost of using an input rises. These costs can be monetary in
the case of private goods and both monetary and time related (due to
delays) in the case of public goods.
In such an economy, a local resource boom can be defined as an ex-
ogenous shock to the natural resource sector in the local regionwhere a
mine is discovered and opened.14 Such a shock will then work itself
through the economy via five distinct channels:
1. First, the demand for labor and public goods in the mineral sector
rises and wages increase in the local region. To the extent that
labor supply is not perfectly inelastic, immigration from thewider re-
gion dampens this increase in wages. For perfectly elastic supply, the
increase in labor demand in the local mineral sector is completely
met by supply from the wider region. Moreover, to the extent that
supply chains are local, firms with strong upstream linkages to
mines may benefit from an increased demand for intermediate in-
puts (Moretti, 2010).
2. Second, the local resource boom raises services prices and thus in-
duces a real appreciation in the local region (a spending effect as in
Corden and Neary, 1982). The production of non-traded services in-
creases too. Higher wages (if local labor demand is not fully met
through immigration) are passed on to higher non-traded prices
through a rise in local aggregate demand.
3. Third, if wages increase,manufacturing profitability declines because
the traded sector is a price taker on world markets. Manufacturing
consequently contracts as firms compete with establishments in
the wider region that do not suffer from increased input costs
(Moretti, 2011). This is a factor reallocation effect (Corden and
Neary, 1982).
4. Fourth, to the extent that labor is mobile between regions and rents
are redistributed across regions, we should expect spillover effects.
The immigration of labor into the local region results in excess
labor demand in thewider region and possibly a shrinking of services
andmanufacturing sectors in this wider region. Unless labor is highly
mobile, this effect attenuates with distance.
5. Higher aggregate demand in the local region spills over into higher
demand for manufactured goods, which must be supplied through
imports from the wider region (or from other countries). This in-
creases the demand for manufacturing goods in the wider region.
This trade effect is particularly strong if no rent redistribution takes
place and local income increases by the full amount of rents. In addi-
tion to positive spatial spill-overs due to an increased demand for
tradable goods, the increase in mineral rents can also spread to the14 New discoveries are assumed to be exogenous as exploration is spatially homoge-
neous within region-years in the sense that it is uncorrelated with pre-existing economic
activity and other local characteristics.wider region through transfers (a spending effect). From the per-
spective of the traded sector, the positive trade and spending effects
are likely to be attenuated less by distance than the wage effect
(which reflects regional competition for relatively immobile labor).
This discussion suggests twomain testable hypotheses regarding the
impact of mining on the business constraints faced by different types of
firms at different distances (that is, the local region and the wider
region):
I. In linewith local factor reallocation effects in the immediate vicinity
of mines, firms in tradeable sectors experience tighter business con-
straints (in terms of access to labor and public goods such as infra-
structure) than firms in non-tradeable sectors or in the natural
resource sector. Positive spending effects benefit firms across all sec-
tors.
II. Negative factor reallocation effects near mines are associated with a
deterioration of the business environment for local firms. In the
wider region, at a greater distance frommines, these negative effects
are partially or more than compensated by positive spending effects
as the business environment improves or the provision of public
goods expands. Moreover, manufacturing firms in the wider region
benefit from an increased demand for their products from booming
mining localities.
3. Data
For our purposes, we need data on the business constraints experi-
enced by individual firms, their main characteristics such as sector and
age, employment, as well as detailed information on the presence of
mines near each firm. We therefore merge our firm-level Enterprise
Survey data from nine emerging markets—Brazil, Chile, China, India,
Indonesia, Kazakhstan,Mexico, Russia andUkraine—with the geograph-
ical coordinates of the near universe of minerals (including coal) and
metal mines in these countries. In addition, we merge these mining
data with balance sheet and financial statement data from Bureau van
Dijk's Orbis company database. While Orbis does not contain informa-
tion about firms' perceived business constraints, it has two main
strengths: it provides a larger sample then the Enterprise Survey and
it provides such data for several years, effectively giving us a firm-
level panel data set.
Our sample of nine emerging markets is constructed by taking the
full list of Enterprise Survey countries as a starting point. For each of
these countries we then calculate the number of mines in the SNL
Metal andMining data set.We select all countries with the largest num-
ber of mines for which we know the operating status, taking 75 as a
minimum cut-off. These are China (n = 696), Russia (497), India
(376), South Africa (344), Ukraine (300), Brazil (154), Peru (137),
Mexico (126), Chile (108), Indonesia (85), and Kazakhstan (85). We
then plot these mines, as well as the Enterprise Survey firms, on
country-level maps to assess their geographical dispersion within each
country. This leads us to exclude Peru and South Africa, where all
firms are concentrated in just four locations per country. Since each of
these locations is in another region, there is no within-region variation
to be exploited in these two countries.
3.1. Mining data
Wedownload data from the leading provider ofmining information,
SNL's Metal & Mining (formerly Raw Materials Group). Of the (non-
coal) mines in our data set, 26% are state-owned while the remainder
is evenly split between firms owned by private domestic investors and
those owned by foreign investors (37% each). The data set contains for
each mine annual information on the production levels for every min-
eral as well as the GPS coordinates of its center point and the mine's
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ing) and inactive mines and to count the number of active mines near
each firm. This status is typically driven by exogenous world prices:
when prices rise, more mines (re-)open. We assemble this information
for the 5595 mines scattered across the nine countries. For a subset of
active mines, we also know metal production and for a small subset
ore production, measured in millions of tons (metric megaton, Mt) of
ore mined per year.15 Although a measure of ore produced (which in-
cludes both rocks and metals and minerals with varying grades) may
be a better gauge of howmany inputs themine requires, this is unfortu-
nately only recorded for one in ten mine-year observations.
We focus onmines rather than the extraction of oil and gas as hydro-
carbon production has a different structure in terms of environmental,
social and economic impacts (World Bank, 2002). For instance, oil and
gas tend to occur in larger concentrations of wealth than metals and
other minerals and this might lead to larger spending effects. Hydrocar-
bon production is also more capital intensive and may therefore affect
labor demand to a lesser extent. Moreover, in our sample, oil and gas
fields are very remote fromalmost allmanufacturing activity.We return
to the issue of hydrocarbon production in Section5.6.3.2. Firm data
Tomeasure firms' business constraints, we use various rounds of the
EBRD-World Bank Business Environment and Enterprise Performance
Survey (BEEPS) and the equivalent World Bank Enterprise Surveys.
Face-to-face interviews were held with 25,777 formal registered firms
in 3351 locations across our country sample to measure to what extent
particular aspects of the business environment hold back firm perfor-
mance. The surveys were administered using a common design and im-
plementation guidelines.
Firmswere selected using random samplingwith three stratification
levels to ensure representativeness across industry,firmsize and region.
The sample includesfirms fromallmain industries (bothmanufacturing
and services) so that we can use industry fixed effects in our regression
framework. While mines were not surveyed, upstream and down-
stream natural resource firms are included. The first six columns of Ap-
pendix Table A3 summarize the number of observations by year and
country while Table A4 gives a sector breakdown. We have data for
the years 2004, 2005, 2007, 2008, 2009 and 2011.
As part of the survey, owners or top managers evaluated aspects of
the local business environment and public infrastructure in terms of
howmuch they constrain the firm's operations. For instance, one ques-
tion asks: “Is electricity “No obstacle”, a “Minor obstacle”, a “Moderate ob-
stacle”, a “Major obstacle” or a “Very severe obstacle” to the current
operations of your establishment?”. Similar information was elicited
about the following business constraints: inadequately educated work-
force; access to finance; transportation infrastructure; practices of com-
petitors in the informal sector; access to land; crime, theft and disorder;
business licenses and permits; corruption; and courts. Crucially, these
questions allow us to measure competition for inputs directly because
they reflect a firm's intended use of inputs as opposed to their actual
use. Moreover, we do not have to rely on price data which often do
not exist for non-market public goods. Because the scaling of the answer
categories differs across survey rounds (either a five- or a four-point
Likert scale) we rescale all measures to a 0–100 scale using the conver-
sion formula (value – minimum value)/(maximum value – minimum
value). Section5.1 provides tests that confirm that our results are robust
to different rescaling strategies.15 Mines typically produce ore that contains several minerals with varying grades. Ap-
pendix Table A2 provides a frequency table of the minerals in our data set. All minerals
and metals are point-source resources: unlike diffuse natural resources such as coffee
and tobacco, they are produced in geographically concentrated locations. Limited informa-
tion on reserves is also available butwe focus on actualmining activity as unmined subsoil
assets should not affect firm performance directly.For each firm we construct Average business constraints,whichmea-
sures the average of the above-mentioned 10 constraint categories. Like
the underlying components, this average ranges between 0 and 100.
Appendix A contains a histogram of the distribution of this variable. In
addition, we create the measures Input constraints (access to land, ac-
cess to an educated workforce, and access to finance); Infrastructure
constraints (electricity and transport); and Institutional constraints
(crime, informal competitors, access to business licenses, corruption,
and court quality). These measures again range between 0 and 100.
The average constraint intensity is 28.8 but there is wide variation
across firms; the standard deviation is 20.3. The most binding con-
straints are those related to access to inputs (32.6), followed by infra-
structure (28.5) and institutional constraints (22.7).
We also create firm-level covariates. These include firm Age in num-
ber of years and dummies for Small firms,Medium-sized firms and Large
firms; International exporters (firms whose main market is abroad); For-
eign firms (foreigners own 10% or more of all equity); and State firms
(state entities own at least 10% of the firm's equity). Moreover, we cre-
ate log Employment as firm-level outcome and construct the following
sector dummies: Manufacturing; Construction; Retail and wholesale;
Real estate, renting and business services; and Others.16 We also use the
Orbis database to construct an analogous log Employment variable for
a larger firm-level panel data set.
For each firmwe know the name and geographical coordinates of its
location (city or town). We exclude firms in capital cities because lim-
ited fiscal redistribution may keep rents disproportionately in the capi-
tal. Table A1 in the Appendix provides all variable definitions while
Table 1 provides summary statistics.3.3. Combining the mining and firm data
A final step in our data construction is to merge—at the local level—
information on individualfirmswith information on themines that sur-
round them.We identify all mines within a radius of 20 km (12.4miles)
and within a distance band of between 21 and 150 km (13.0 and
93.2 miles, respectively) around each firm. Fig. 1 provides a data snap-
shot for two sample countries, Ukraine and Kazakhstan. The top panel
shows the location of firms and mines and indicates that geographical
coverage is comprehensive. Firms are not concentrated in only a few cit-
ies nor are mines clustered in just a few regions. Zooming in to the rect-
angles in the bottom panel reveals substantial variation in distances
between firms and mines. There are both firms with and without
mines in their immediate vicinity (within a 20 kmradius).17 Throughout
all ourmain specifications,we include region-sector-yearfixedeffects so
thatwe compare firmswith andwithout localmineswithin one and the
same geographical region (and in the same industry and year).
Using our merged data, we then create variables that proxy for the
extensive and intensive margin of mining activity in each of these two
distance bands. At the extensive margin, we create dummy variables
that indicate whether a firm has at least one active mine in its direct
or its broader vicinity (Any active mine). In our sample, 22% of all Enter-
prise Survey firms have at least one mine within a 20 km radius while
75% have at least one mine within a 21–150 km radius. These numbers
are 5 and 23% for Orbis firms, respectively. Orbis collects and aggregates
firm-level data from official business registers, annual reports,
newswires, and webpages. Instead, the enterprise surveys take the uni-
verse of firms (typically obtained from a country's statistical office) as
the initial sampling framework. Stratified random sampling is then
used to select the firms to be interviewed. One of the sampling strata
is the geographic region within a country. This stratification helps to16 Once we categorize firms into traded, non-traded, construction and natural resource
related sectors, we replace sector dummies with dummies for these categories.
17 In defining the distance bands, we draw circles around firms and disregard all borders,
both national and within-country administrative ones. In Section5.2 we explicitly distin-
guish between mines inside and outside administrative borders.
Table 1
Summary statistics.




Average business constraints 25,778 28.79 25 20.30 0 100
Input constraints 25,762 32.62 33 24.46 0 100
Infrastructure constraints 25,766 28.51 25 27.29 0 100
Institutional constraints 25,763 22.71 20 24.15 0 100
Employment (ln, Enterprise
Survey)
24,313 4.66 4.61 1.74 0 13.50
Employment (ln, ORBIS) 328,615 3.51 3.22 1.08 2.30 11.70
Independent variables
№ active mines 0–20 km 25,778 0.55 0 1.77 0 22
№ active mines 21–150 km 25,778 7.50 3 15.13 0 169
Total mining output 0–20 km
(ln)
5,451 18.52 18.52 0.98 15.18 22.69
Total mining output 21–150 km
(ln)
5,451 20.21 20.19 1.12 15.71 22.25
№ oil and gas fields 0–20 km 25,778 0.01 0 0.08 0 1
№ oil and gas fields 21–150 km 25,778 0.27 0 0.70 0 5
Oil and gas reserves 0–20 km
(ln)
25,778 0.04 0 0.59 0 8.48
Oil and gas reserves 21–150 km
(ln)
25,778 1.17 0 2.69 0 9.83
Oil and gas remaining reserves
0–20 km (ln)
25,778 0.03 0 0.35 0 5.37
Oil and gas remaining reserves
21–150 km (ln)
25,778 0.78 0 1.86 0 9.28
Small firm 25,778 0.24 0 0.43 0 1
Medium-sized firm 25,778 0.29 0 0.46 0 1
Large firm 25,778 0.43 0 0.50 0 1
Firm age 25,778 15.52 11 14.56 0 203
Foreign firm 25,778 0.13 0 0.34 0 1
State firm 25,778 0.14 0 0.35 0 1
Firm competes internationally 25,778 0.11 0 0.31 0 1
Notes: This table provides summary statistics for all variables used in the analysis. Table A1
in the Appendix contains all variable definitions.
19 We use the estimator developed by Correia (2016) to deal with large datasets with
multiple levels of fixed effects in a computationally efficient way.
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cities and in regions with more mines.
At the intensive margin, we measure the number of mines around
firms (№ active mines). On average, a firm has 0.6 active mines within
a 20 km radius but there is wide variation: this variable ranges between
0 and 22 mines. Within a 21–150 km distance band, the number of ac-
tive mines is on average 7.5 and again ranges widely between zero
and 169 mines (all numbers based on the Enterprise Survey data). We
also create similar variables that measure inactive mines and mines
with an unknown operating status and use these as control variables.
4. Empirical strategy
We first consider the following empirical model to estimate the im-
pact of mining on firms' business constraints within a certain distance
band:
Yfsrct ¼ βMfsrc;t−2 þ γXfsrct þ Ssrt þ εfsrct ð1Þ
where Yfsrct indicates for firm f in sector s in region r of country c in year t
the localAverage business constraints it experienced on a scale of 0 to 100
or, more specifically, its Input constraints, Infrastructure constraints or In-
stitutional constraints. Mfsrc,t-2 contains a number of two-year lagged in-
dicators of local mining activity within a 0–20 or 21–150 km spatial
band around firm f.18Xfsrct is a matrix of covariates related to firm age,
size and ownership.18 While it may take time for mining to affect local firms, impacts and employment gen-
eration may already be substantial during the investment phase (Benshaul-Tolonen,
2019). Unreported tests show that our results are robust to changing the time lag to zero,
one or three years. Because we do not know for each mine how long it has been active or
closed (due to incomplete recording of the history before the year 2000) we do not at-
tempt to separate short-run from medium or long-run effects.We saturate themodel with sector-region-yearfixed effects—Ssrt—to
wipe out (un)observable variation at this level and to rule out that
our results reflect industry-specific demand shocks or region-
specific production structures. These fixed effects mean that we
consistently compare—within one and the same geographical re-
gion of a country—firms with and without nearby mines. They also
take care of any (unintended) differences in survey implementation
across countries, years and sectors and they absorb time-invariant
differences (such as geography) as well as time-varying differences
(such as in the business climate) between resource-rich and
resource-poor regions in a country that may correlate with both re-
sources and firm constraints.19
Lastly, we double cluster robust standard errors by country-sector-
year level and by region. Appendix Table A5 shows that our results are
robust to alternative clustering strategies. We are interested in the
OLS estimate of β, which we interpret as the impact of local mining in-
tensity on firms' business constraints.20 In a second part of the analysis,
we will regress employment on thus predicted business constraints.
Our data also allow us to test whether the impact of mines on firm
constraints differs across sectors. As discussed in Section2, theory sug-
gests that the impact of local mining may be positive for non-
tradeable sectors but negative for firms in tradeable sectors. We there-
fore also estimate:
Yfsrct ¼ βMfsrc;t−2  Ns þ γXfsrct þ Ssrt þ εfsrct ð2Þ
where Ns is one of four dummies that identify whether a firm is in a
Tradeable sector, the Construction sector, a Non-traded sector or the Nat-
ural resource sector. We discuss this sector classification in more detail
in Section5.2.
Our identification exploits that the local presence of mining de-
posits is plausibly exogenous and reflects random “geological
anomalies” (Eggert, 2001; Black et al., 2005). The only assumption
we need is that spatial exploration intensity within region-years is
homogeneous in the sense that it is uncorrelated with pre-
existing business constraints and other local characteristics. We
can then treat the local presence of mines as a quasi-experimental
setting that allows us to identify the general equilibrium effects of
exogenous geologic endowments on local businesses. To the extent
that exploration intensity is driven by institutional quality, open-
ness to FDI or environmental regulation, such effects will be taken
care of by our sector-region-year fixed effects.
5. Results
5.1. Baseline results
Table 2 reports our baseline results on the impact of mining on local
business constraints. The dependent variable is the average of the busi-
ness constraints as perceived by a firm. In line with our discussion in
Section2, we find that nearby mining activity increases the business
constraints experienced by firms. In light of hypothesis I, this suggests
that the negative effect for tradeable sector firms dominates in this sam-
ple of all firms. In contrast,mining activity relaxes constraints at a longer
distance: between 21 and 150 kmwe findmostly beneficial mining im-
pacts, providing prima facie evidence for hypothesis II.21 This holds re-
gardless of whether we saturate the model with country-sector-year20 Alternatively, one can estimate (1) with ordered logit to reflect that our constraints
measure is the average of rescaled business constraints. However, after rescaling and av-
eraging, the resulting business-constraints measure takes 465 different values, which
makes logit results less straightforward to interpret. All our results are nevertheless robust
to ordered logit estimation or to using a Tobit model with a lower (upper) limit of 0 (100).
21 The unreported covariate coefficients show that larger firms are more and foreign-
owned firms less constrained on average. Firm age does not matter much.
Table 2
Local mining and business constraints.
Dependent variable → Average business
constraints
№ active mines 0–20
km





1st stage 2nd stage
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
№ active mines 0–20 km 1.051*** 1.358** 0.257** 0.178** 0.226*** 0.226***
(0.377) (0.648) (0.130) (0.069) (0.063) (0.083)
№ active mines 21–150 km −1.648* −1.939** −0.224*** −0.056* −0.111** −0.111*
(0.980) (0.941) (0.084) (0.032) (0.047) (0.061)
Total mining output 0–20 km (ln) 2.237*** −1.766*
(0.416) (1.072)
Total mining output 21–150 km (ln) 0.052 9.647***
(0.089) (1.371)
Definition “№ active mines” Ln(n + 1) Ln(n) Count Count Count Count Count Count
Country-Sector-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No
Region-Sector-Year FE No No No No No No Yes Yes
Region FE No No No No No Yes No No
Clustering CSY CSY CSY CSY CSY CSY CSY CSY + R
Firm controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls for inactive mines Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls for active mines No Yes No No No No No No
Combined 1st stage F-test 20.35
Observations 25,777 25,777 5451 5451 5451 25,770 25,651 25,651
R-squared 0.260 0.260 0.032 0.327 0.357 0.357
Notes:This table showsOLS regressions (columns 1-2 and6-8) and IV regressions (columns 3-5) to estimate the impact of localmining activity onfirms' business constraints. In columns 3-
8, No. active mines 0-20 km (21-150 km) are count variables. In column 1, the No. active mines variables are expressed as the log of the number of active mines plus 1. In column 2, theNo.
activemines variables are expressed as the log of thenumber of activemineswheremissing values are set to zero (while adding separate dummyvariables Any activemine 0-20 km(21-150
km)). In columns 3-5, we instrument the number of activemineswith themedian amount ofmetal ormineral produced by othermineswithin each country-mineral/metal cellmultiplied
by theworld price of themineral/metal. Robust standard errors are clusteredby country-sector-year and shown inparentheses. In column8, standard errors are clustered byboth country-
sector-year (CSY) and by region (R). ***, **, * correspond to the 1%, 5%, and 10% level of significance, respectively. All specifications include country-year-sector fixed effects (except col-
umns 7 and 8 which include region-sector-year fixed effects), firm controls (size, age, international exporter and ownership), controls for inactive mines in the vicinity of firms, and a
dummy for whether a mine of any status exists in the administrative region of the firm. Sectors are Manufacturing; Construction; Retail and wholesale; Real estate, renting and business
services; Other. Table 1 contains summary statistics and Appendix Table A1 contains variable definitions and data sources.
Fig. 1.Geographical distribution offirms andmines. These graphs depict the geographical distribution of thefirms andmines in our dataset for Ukraine (left) and Kazakhstan (right). Scale
varies by country. Similarmaps are available for Brazil, Chile, China, India, Indonesia,Mexico, and Russia in the online Appendix. Red triangles (blue dots) indicate individualfirms (mines).
The lowermaps zoom in to the area highlighted by the red rectangles in the upper maps. The circles around firms have a 20 km radius. Source: EBRD-World Bank BEEPS Surveys and SNL
Metals and Mining.
115R. De Haas, S. Poelhekke / Journal of International Economics 117 (2019) 109–124
116 R. De Haas, S. Poelhekke / Journal of International Economics 117 (2019) 109–124fixed effects (columns 1–5), country-sector-year effects and region
fixed effects (column 6) or even more stringent region-sector-year
fixed effects (columns 7–8 and following tables).22 Moreover, the re-
sults hold when clustering standard errors at the country-sector-year
level (columns 1–7) and when double clustering at that level and at
the regional level (column 8).
We experiment with different functional forms of our main inde-
pendent variables: the number of active mines in the 0–20 km and
21–150 km spatial bands around each firm. In the first column, we
take the log of the number of mines plus one, to allow for possible con-
cavity in mining impacts. In column 2, the No. active mines variables are
expressed as the log of the number of active mines where missing
values are set to zero. We now also add two (unreported) dummy var-
iables that separate out localities with and without mining activity in
the two distance rings. The economic and statistical significance of our
earlier results hardly changes. That is, even when we control for the
fact that locations with mining activity may be different from locations
without mining, we find that—conditional on mines being present—
more mining activity leads to tighter business constraints nearby and
fewer constraints further away. Because concavity in themining impact
does not change the baseline impacts, we measure mining activity by
the mine count in the remainder of the paper.
Unobservable within-country shocks may influence both local
mining activity and firm constraints. To mitigate such concerns, col-
umns 3–5 provide an IV framework in which we instrument the num-
ber of active mines around each firm. To construct our instrument
Total mining output, we first multiply the world price of the main
metal produced by each mine with the median mine size (annual
amount of metal produced) of the other mines in the same country
that produce the samemetal.We do this because the volume of ore pro-
duced—and its mineral content—is only recorded for a subset of
mines.23 We then take the sum of this variable for all mines (of any op-
erating status) near a firm. If the operational status of mines is indeed
driven by exogenous world prices, then the prices of locally available
commodities should be a strong predictor of whether mines are open
or not. This turns out to be the case: the first stages for the number of
active mines in the 0–20 km and 21–150 km bands yield F-statistics
that are comfortably above 10 (column 3 and 4).24 In the second stage
(column 5), we replicate both the strong adverse effects in the 0–20 dis-
tance band and the strong beneficial effects in thewider 21–150 band.25
In sum, Table 2 shows that mining activity is robustly associated
with a deterioration of the business environment in the immediate vi-
cinity of firms butwith an improvement at a longer distance. Condition-
ing on the presence of any mines, we find that this effect is stronger
when there are more mines. These results are in line with negative
local factor reallocation effects and positive regional-spending effects.
A one standard deviation increase in nearby mining increases the aver-
age business constraint by 0.4 percentage points (comparedwith an av-
erage of 28.8)whilemore distantmining activity reduces constraints by
1.7 percentage points. The effect of mining on the local business envi-
ronment hence appears modest for the average firm. However, theory
predicts that the sign of the impact will depend on the sector of the
firm. In Section5.2 we therefore split the average effect by sector22 As regions we use the highest administrative level in each country, such as states in
Brazil and Mexico (estado), regions in Chile (región), mainland provinces in China, oblasts
in Kazakhstan and Ukraine, and federal subjects in Russia.
23 Somemetals tend to occur in smaller quantities than others such that a high price per
metric ton on the worldmarket has a larger effect on larger (and thus more valuable) de-
posits. For instance, a typical lead mine only produces 1 Mt. of ore per year while the av-
erage copper mine produces 14.5 Mt.
24 The sample size is reduced here since we cannot estimate the mine size when output
information ismissing for othermines that produce the samemetal ormineral in the same
country.
25 These IV results are robust to multi-way clustering by country-sector-year and by
region.while in Section5.3 we estimate the real effects of increased business
constraints and find that these are substantial.
Lastly, it is important to point out thatwe are agnostic about the spa-
tial range within which mines can affect firms. We therefore explored
various spatial rings used in the literature.26 We assess distance circles
of radius 10, 20, 50, 100, 150, and 450 km. Table 3 shows positive effects
on firms' constraints up to 20 km (that is, a deterioration of the business
environment) after which the sign switches to negative effects (an im-
provement) up to 150 km. After 150 km the effects become very small
and insignificant. This is visualized in the graph on the left-hand side
of Fig. 2 inwhich each point represents a separate regression.We there-
fore group mines into three distance bands: up to 20 km, 21–150 km
and 151–450 km and find that only the first two bands show significant
and economically meaningful results (see the right-hand side graph in
Fig. 2 inwhich each panel is the result of a single regression). Our results
are robust to redefining these two distance bands by reducing or
expanding them by 10%.
5.2. The impact of mining on tradeable versus non-tradeable sectors
Our hypotheses I and II state that local mining activity affects trade-
able and non-tradeable sectors in different ways. To test this prior, we
need to decide whether firms belong to a tradeable or a non-tradeable
sector. This split is not entirely straightforward as many goods can
both be consumed locally and traded (inter)nationally. For example, a
leather tannery may sell exclusively to a local downstream clothing
manufacturer or may (also) sell internationally. To deal with this
issue, we apply two methods to classify sectors and show that our re-
sults are robust to either method.
First, we follow Mian and Sufi (2014) and classify the retail sector,
restaurants, hotels and services of motor vehicles as non-tradeable
(NT). Construction is classified separately (C), while non-metallic min-
eral products plus basic metals are labelled as natural resource sectors
(R). All other sectors are then considered tradeables (T).
Second, we define tradeables and non-tradeables according to their
geographical concentration, following Ellison and Glaeser (1997). The
idea is that producers of traded goods do not have to locate close to con-
sumers and can therefore agglomerate, while producers of non-traded
goods spread across space to serve nearby consumers. A measure of ag-
glomeration is then informative of the degree of tradeability. We con-
struct Ellison and Glaeser's index that is a measure of excess
concentration with respect to a random distribution of sectors across
space. Let G be a measure of geographic concentration, where ssd is the
share of industry s's employment in region d and xd the share of aggre-





Furthermore, let H be the Herfindahl-Hirschmann index of industry







26 Kotsadam and Tolonen (2016) and Benshaul-Tolonen (2019) show that the impact of
African gold mines on labor markets is strongest within a radius of 15 to 20 km. Cust
(2015) finds that labor market impacts are concentrated within a 15 km radius around
Indonesian mines. Aragón and Rud (2016) use a 20 km radius to study agricultural pro-
ductivity near African gold mines while Van der Goltz and Barnwall (2018) take a 5 km
cutoff based on prior evidence on the spatial extent of pollution. Aragón and Rud (2013)
analyze longer-distance impacts (100 km) of the Peruvian mine they study. Finally,
Glaeser et al. (2015) examine distances of up to 500 km between historical coal deposits
and US cities. Papers that focus on district-level impacts due to fiscal channels typically
also use longer distances (Loayza et al., 2016 and Allcott and Keniston, 2018).
Table 3
Average business constraints as a function of mines at varying distances from firms.
s = 10 s = 20 s = 50 s = 100 s = 150 s = 450 s = 20 s = 20 s = 20
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9]
№ active mines within s km 0.474* 0.155** −0.064+ −0.068*** −0.072** 0.003 0.163** 0.226*** 0.226***
(0.254) (0.076) (0.044) (0.025) (0.032) (0.007) (0.080) (0.063) (0.083)
№ active mines 21–150 km −0.081*** −0.111** −0.111*
(0.023) (0.047) (0.061)
№ active mines 151–450 km 0.013
(0.011)
Region-Sector-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustering CSY CSY CSY CSY CSY CSY CSY CSY CSY + R
Firm controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls for inactive mines Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 25,651 25,651 25,651 25,651 25,651 25,651 25,651 25,651 25,651
R-squared 0.355 0.355 0.355 0.356 0.357 0.355 0.357 0.357 0.357
Notes: This table shows OLS regressions to estimate the impact of local mining activity, measured at varying distances from firms, on firms' average business constraints. Robust standard
errors are clustered by country-sector-year (CSY), and in column 9 also by region (R), and shown in parentheses. ***, **, *, + correspond to the 1%, 5%, 10%, and 15% level of significance,
respectively. All specifications include region-sector-year fixed effects, firm controls (size, age, international exporter, and ownership), controls for inactive mines measured within the
same distance from firms as the number of active mines, and a dummy for whether a mine of any status exists in the administrative region of the firm. Constant included but not
shown. Table 1 contains summary statistics and Appendix Table A1 contains variable definitions and data sources.

















AsHs approaches zero (at high levels of aggregation, when the num-
ber of plants is large, or for an increasing number of equally sized estab-




2Þ and is a rescaled measure of
raw concentration. The index is unbounded on both sides, but E(γs)
= 0 when no agglomerative spillovers or natural advantages exist.
Positive values suggest more concentration than a random distribu-
tion would predict, while negative values suggest that establishments
locate themselves relatively diffusely. We calculate γs for each
country-sector-year to allow for different development stages of
each country over time, which may translate into changing agglomer-
ation patterns. As in Mian and Sufi (2014), we classify sectors as non-Fig. 2. Local mining and business constraints: Distance decay. These graphs show correlation
constraints as perceived by nearby firms. The left-hand graph shows the estimated coefficient
circle with a radius of 20, 50, 100, 150 or 450 km around individual firms. The right-hand
150 km, 150–450 km) or two distance rings (b20 km and 20-150 km) simultaneously in one
sector-year fixed effects, firm controls (size, age, international exporter, and ownership), con
active mines, and a dummy for whether a mine of any status exists in the administrative regiotraded if they are within the first decile (most dispersed) of the
country-sectorγs distribution.
When we compare both classification methods, the overall differ-
ences are limited. Firms in construction and natural resources
never change sector by definition. At the margin, different methodolo-
gies cause some firms to switch between tradeable and non-tradeable
status, but the differences in terms of sample size by classification are
minimal. We note that the average index value of the Ellison-Glaeser
index is close to zero (−0.298) for tradeable sectors, but much more
negative (−2.164) for the non-tradeable sectors, indicating more
dispersion.
In Table 4 we use our baseline classification based on Mian and Sufi
(2014), except for column 3 where we use the Ellison and Glaeser
(1997) classification. Using either split, we find that only traded firms,
which take world or national output prices as a given, suffer from
nearby mining while natural resource and non-traded firms benefit.
These opposite impacts are consistent with the predictions of Corden
and Neary (1982) and our discussion in Section2. The precision of the
estimates for non-tradeables varies depending on the type of fixed ef-
fects we include. The baseline effect on tradeable firms is strong
throughout.s between local mining activity (measured as № active mines) and the average business
s from separate regressions (see Table 3) where№ active mines counts all mines within a
graph shows the estimated coefficients when using three distance rings (b20 km, 20–
regression. Vertical lines depict 90% confidence bands. All specifications include region-
trols for inactive mines measured within the same distance from firms as the number of
n of the firm.
Table 4
Local mining and business constraints: Sector heterogeneity.
Dependent variable
→
























[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10]
№ active mines
0–20 km
x Traded 0.528*** 0.339*** 0.301*** 0.339*** 0.296** 0.016** 0.406** 0.300* 1.395*** 18.88***
(0.114) (0.095) (0.097) (0.108) (0.112) (0.008) (0.175) (0.172) (0.288)
x Construction −0.596+ −0.356 −0.357 −0.356+ −0.462*** −0.009 −0.166 −1.139** 0.664 2.19
(0.383) (0.435) (0.438) (0.220) (0.155) (0.013) (0.291) (0.545) (0.914)
x Non-traded −1.183** −1.103 −0.672*** −1.103 −1.287 −0.058 −1.433 −1.568*** 0.284 7.42***
(0.496) (0.912) (0.143) (0.882) (0.986) (0.044) (1.118) (0.441) (0.406)
x Natural
resources
−0.246*** 0.048 0.044 0.048 0.105 0.006+ 0.050 −0.233*** −0.248 0.00
(0.030) (0.041) (0.040) (0.137) (0.129) (0.004) (0.115) (0.056) (0.192)
№ active mines
21–150 km
x Traded −0.114 −0.147** −0.142** −0.147* −0.149* −0.006** −0.163** −0.288*** −0.085 7.81***
(0.111) (0.058) (0.058) (0.085) (0.084) (0.003) (0.076) (0.079) (0.090)
x Construction −0.231+ −0.131 −0.123 −0.131 −0.138 −0.008 −0.181 −0.423** −0.158 1.00
(0.150) (0.290) (0.287) (0.290) (0.295) (0.011) (0.281) (0.163) (0.184)
x Non-traded −0.039 0.006 0.036 0.006 −0.000 0.001 0.029 −0.143* −0.004 0.86
(0.103) (0.113) (0.121) (0.131) (0.133) (0.007) (0.165) (0.076) (0.124)
x Natural
resources
−0.279*** −0.187*** −0.182*** −0.187*** −0.149* −0.008*** −0.206*** −0.322*** −0.260** 0.47
(0.095) (0.060) (0.060) (0.058) (0.081) (0.002) (0.049) (0.090) (0.123)
Country-Sector-Year
FE
Yes No No No No No No Yes
Region-Sector-Year FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Clustering CSY CSY CSY CSY + R CSY + R CSY + R CSY + R CSY
Firm controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls for inactive
mines
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 24,435 24,340 24,354 24,340 22,956 23,749 24,336 24,435
R-squared 0.270 0.363 0.353 0.363 0.368 0.361 0.350 0.272
Notes: This table shows OLS regressions to estimate the impact of local mining activity on firms' business constraints. All columns include country-sector-year fixed effects except for col-
umns 2-7which include region-sector-year fixed effects. Robust standard errors are clustered by country-sector-year (CSY) in all columns except columns 4-7where they are clustered by
both country-sector-year and region (R). In column 3, sectors are classified using Ellison and Glaeser (1997) so that (non-)tradeables are defined according to their geographical concen-
tration. The index is a measure of excess concentration with respect to a random distribution of sectors across space, where excess concentration may either reflect natural advantages or
agglomeration economies. Column 5 is based on a sample of firms that are at least four years old. In columns 6 (7), the dependent variable is the principal component (average) of the five
business constraints that were included in each survey wave and country (electricity, transport, crime, access to finance, and educated workforce). In columns 8 and 9, local mine counts
are split according towhether they are inside or outside the administrative region of the firm, respectively. Column 10 shows F-statistics for a test of equal coefficients in columns 8 and 9.
Standard errors are shown in parentheses. ***, **, *, + correspond to the 1%, 5%, 10%, and 15% level of significance, respectively. All specifications include firm controls (size, age, interna-
tional exporter, and ownership) and controls for inactivemines in the vicinity of firms. Constant included but not shown. Table 1 contains summary statistics and Appendix Table A1 con-
tains variable definitions and data sources.
27 We apply the iterated principal factor method and keep the first factor only.
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number of active mines within a radius of 20 km leads to a 0.6 per-
centage point increase in the average business constraints for firms
in tradeable sectors. In contrast, an increase in local mining activity re-
duces business constraints by up to 1.9 percentage points for firms in
non-tradeable sectors and by 0.6 percentage points for construction
firms (see also column 1 in Table 6, where we report these marginal
effects).
At a longer distance, most firm types tend to benefit from local min-
ing activity. These effects are most precisely and robustly estimated for
firms in the tradeable sector. The results in column 2 indicate that a one
standard deviation increase in mining activity in the 21–150 km band
leads to a decline in business constraints of 2.2, 2.0 and 1.3 percentage
points for firms in the traded, construction and natural resource sectors,
respectively.
In column 5, we limit the sample to firms that are at least four years
old. This should mitigate worries that the location of firms is endoge-
nous to (recent changes in) mining activities. Our results hold up well.
In Tables 5 and 7 we will address this issue more directly by using
panel data that allow for the inclusion of firm fixed effects.
In columns 6 and 7, we provide two robustness tests regarding the
construction and scaling of the business constraint variables. In column6, we take the principle component of the five main business
constraints27 whereas in column 7 we take the simple average. Ques-
tions on these main constraints—electricity, transport, crime, access to
finance, and educated workforce—were included in each survey wave
and each country. Importantly, with the exception of the 2005 wave
in Kazakhstan, Russia and Ukraine, these questions were also consis-
tently asked on a 5-point scale. In both columns the main results hold
up well: in the immediate vicinity of mines, tradeable-sector firms suf-
ferwhereas at a larger distance tradeable-sector firms aswell asfirms in
the natural-resource sector are less constrained.
Lastly, and importantly, in columns 8 and 9 we split the mine count
near firms according to whether mines are inside (8) or outside (9) the
administrative region in which the firm is located. The stark heteroge-
neity in the effects of mining activity on firms in different sectors and
at different distances is clearly visible for mines that are located within
the firm's administrative region itself. Column 10 provides an F-test for
the equality of the estimated coefficients for the effect of mines that are
within the firm's region and mines that are near but outside the firm's
administrative region. Within the 20 km circle, we find two important
effects. First, traded firms are not only negatively affected by nearby
Table 5
Local mining, business constraints and firm performance.
1st stage 2nd stage
Dependent variable → Average business
constraints
Employment (ln)










Data type → Cross-sectional data Panel data
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7]
−0.027** −0.033** −0.012*** −0.004 −0.003 −0.030***



















x Natural resources −0.159**
(0.059)
Region-Sector-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustering CSY + R CSY + R CSY + R CSY + R CSY +
R
CSY + R CSY + R
Firm FE No No No No Yes Yes Yes
Firm and inactive mine controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 24,417 24,252 22,587 17,906 588 574 362
№ clusters, smallest dimension 49 49 49 13 24 24 6
Kleibergen-Paap
F-statistic
5.294 12.48 12.48 – – –
Hansen J-test p-value 0.263 0.392 0.392 – – –
Notes: This table shows 2SLS regressions to estimate the impact of localmining activity on firmperformance. Columns 5–7 showpanel regressionswith firmfixed effects based on a subset
offirms that were surveyed in at least two years. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses and clustered by country-sector-year (CSY) and by region (R). ***, **, *,+ correspond to
the 1%, 5%, 10%, and 15% level of significance, respectively. All specifications include region-sector-year fixed effects, firm controls and controls for inactive mines in the vicinity of firms.
Constant included but not shown. Table 1 contains summary statistics and Appendix Table A1 contains variable definitions and data sources.
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the administrative border. This indicates that the negative impact of
mining on the producers of tradeable goods does not simply reflect
worsening institutions at the local administrative level. Second, the im-
pact on non-traded firms depends on whether the mines are within or
outside the administrative region. Nearbymines inside the same admin-
istrative region benefit non-trading firms whereas nearby mines just
outside the administrative boundary have no impact or even hurt non-
traded firms (the coefficient is positive but imprecisely estimated). A
likely reason for these contrasting effects on traded and non-traded sec-
tor firms is that nearby mines just outside the firm's administrative re-
gion do not contribute to a spending effect through the government of
the region where the firm is located, but nevertheless add to competi-
tion for inputs and for access to scarce infrastructure. In other words,
the competition effect transcends administrative borders, while the
spending effect does not.
Next we unpack the average business constraint variable to un-
derstand how local mining affects firms in different sectors. To get
at the underlying mechanisms, Fig. 3 disaggregates the firm impacts
by showing both point estimates (dots) and 90% confidence inter-
vals (horizontal lines) from OLS regressions to estimate the impact
of local mining on business constraints in tradable (left) and
non-tradable (right) sectors. The top-left graph shows that
tradeable-sector firms mainly experience tighter constraints re-
lated to increased corruption, problematic access to qualified em-
ployees, and transport infrastructure. In line with recent findings
by Couttenier et al. (2017) and Berman et al. (2017) there is also a
small increase in crime. The upper right chart of Fig. 3 shows somequite large beneficial effects of nearby mines on non-traded firms,
which underlie the aggregate constraint impacts in Table 4. How-
ever, only few of these individual effects are estimated precisely.
Non-tradeable firms report the clearest improvements in their ac-
cess to electricity and to an educated workforce.
The beneficial (though generally smaller) effects of mining at a
larger distance manifest themselves mainly in the form of fewer prob-
lems in accessing inputs. This is due to better access to an educated
workforce, better infrastructure, and better access to land (Fig. 3, bot-
tom left graph). The infrastructure results suggest that governments in
our country sample use natural resource revenues to invest in regional
public infrastructure, in line with some of the examples given in
Section1. Finally, it is possible that there are unmeasured positive local
effects if the informal sector supplies services tomines. However, the re-
sults for the business constraint “informal sector competition” suggest
that informal activity does not become more prevalent when mines
open. If anything, the negative coefficients suggest a reduction in such
competition.5.3. Real effects
An important empirical question is whether the impact ofmining on
business constraints also translates into measurable effects on firm per-
formance. Commander and Svejnar (2011, henceforth CS) examine the
impact of local business constraints on firms using BEEPS data for 26
European transition countries. They find that country fixed effects ab-
sorb nearly all the variation in business constraints across firms within
Fig. 3. Localmining and individual business constraints. These graphs depict the point estimates (dots) and 90% confidence intervals (horizontal lines) fromOLS regressions to estimate the
impact of local mining activity on firms' business constraints in tradable (left) and non-tradable (right) sectors. In the underlying regressions, robust standard errors are clustered by
country-sector-year and by region and all specifications include region-sector-year fixed effects, firm controls (size, age, international exporter, and ownership), controls for inactive
mines in the vicinity of firms, and a dummy for whether a mine of any status exists in the administrative region of the firm. Table 1 contains summary statistics and Appendix
Table A1 contains variable definitions and data sources.
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characteristics) are responsible for holding back firms.
To assess the relation between business constraints and firm perfor-
mance, we use a 2SLS approach. In the first stage we instrument busi-
ness constraints with local mining activity (and the interaction terms
of mining activity with economic sector dummies). In the second
stage we then treat firm-level business constraints as the endogenous
variable that explains firm performance. This approach deals with pos-
sible endogeneity that arises when firms report higher constraints due
to an increased demand for their products in mining regions. It also re-
duces concerns about measurement error and cultural biases in self-
reported statistics.
We focus on firm performance as measured by total employment
(and control for other firm characteristics). Alternative measures such
as sales are only available for a small subset of firms that report these
numbers (for instance, the 2005 survey wave did not include questions
about assets or sales in China, Kazakhstan, Russia and Ukraine). InTable 6




Interaction with ↓ [1] [2]
№ active mines 0–20 km All sectors 0.4 −1.2%
x Traded 0.6 −1.9%
x Construction −0.6 1.9%
x Non-traded −1.9 6.0%
x Natural resources 0.1 −0.3%
№ active mines 21–150 km All sectors −1.7 5.2%
x Traded −2.2 6.9%
x Construction −2.0 6.1%
x Non-traded 0.1 −0.3%
x Natural resources −1.3 4.1%
Notes: This table shows marginal effects of a one standard deviation increase in mining
by main sector types. Coefficients for column 1 are taken from Table 2 column 8 (‘All sec-
tors’) and Table 4 column 5 (‘by sector’). Coefficients for column 2 are taken from Table 5
column 2.Table 7, wewill also assess the impact of local mining on firm-level em-
ployment using data from Orbis.
Table 5 provides our results while column 2 in Table 6 summarizes
the related marginal effects. Column 1 in Table 5 reports the first-
stage regression, which also includes interaction terms between local
mining activity and the four main economic sectors. The specification
again contains region-sector-year fixed effects and our standard firm-
level covariates. We exclude firm size as it is likely a “bad control” that
is affected bymining activity itself. As before, we find that mining activ-
ity in a 21–150 km band around firms reduces average business con-
straints for firms whereas mining in the immediate vicinity (b20 km)
hurts firms in tradeable sectors. Local mining activity is overall a strong
predictor of average business constraints. This is confirmed by the gen-
erally strong first stage F-test on the excluded instruments. Our instru-
ments (mining activity and the sectoral interaction terms) appear valid
according to a Hansen's J-test for overidentifying restrictions.
In the second stage, we regress the log of employment on the aver-
age of reported constraints (columns 2–7).28 Here too, we include
firm covariates related to ownership and age and saturate the model
with region-sector-year fixed effects. Including this rich set of controls
and fixed effects allows us to examinewhether constraints as predicted
by local mining activity matter when controlling for both national insti-
tutions and regional characteristics.
The results in columns 2–4 show that predicted business constraints
reduce employment and that the effect is economically significant: a
one standard deviation increase in local mining activity reduces em-
ployment by 1.5%.29 Of course the exclusion restriction may not hold
completely: for some firms mining activity might have a direct effect
on demand and hence employment. We therefore also show sub-28 Employment is the sum of permanent full-time employees plus the number of part-
time or temporary employees at the end of the last fiscal year.
29 These negative real impacts also indicate that an increase in self-reported business
constraints does not simply reflect a booming local economy in which firms struggle to
meet demand. If this drove our results in Tables 2 and 4, then we should find that lower
reported business constraints lead to positive instead of negative real effects. In other
words, instrumenting firm-level constraints reduces concerns about the endogeneity of
firms' demand for inputs in the sense that more productive firms need more inputs and
thus feel more constrained.
Table 7
Local mining, business constraints and firm performance: ORBIS panel data.
Dependent variable → Employment (ln)







№ active mines 0–20
km
x Traded −0.032 −0.034** −0.034**
(0.026) (0.014) (0.014)
x Construction 0.004 0.018
(0.050) (0.033)








x Traded 0.009* 0.010** 0.010**
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
x Construction −0.001 0.005
(0.007) (0.004)






Observations 328,615 300,159 126,596
R-squared 0.938 0.897 0.898
№ clusters 112 107 28
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes
Region-Sector-Year FE Yes Yes Yes




Notes: This table shows OLS panel regressions, using a sample of firms on which informa-
tion is available in ORBIS, to estimate the impact of two-year lagged local mining activity
on firm employment. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses and clustered by
country-sector-year (CSY) as well as by region (R). ***, **, *, + correspond to the 1%, 5%,
and 10% level of significance, respectively. All specifications include region-sector-year
fixed effects and firm controls (exporter status, legal form dummy and a dummy for listed
firms). Constant included but not shown. Table 1 contains summary statistics and Appen-
dix Table A1 contains variable definitions and data sources.
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restriction is the highest: large firms and non-tradeable firms. Excluding
the largest firms also disregards firms that are likely to be less sensitive
to the local business environment. The results show that when we ex-
clude the 5% largest firms (column 3) and non-traded firms (column
4) our results go through.30
While our main data set consists of repeated but independently
sampled rounds of cross-sectional survey data, about 5% of all firms
were interviewed at least twice (in separate survey rounds) in
Chile, Kazakhstan, Mexico, Russia and Ukraine. We can use this
panel to observe the same firms at different points in time and to
compare firms that experienced an increase in local mining activity
with firms that did not. Importantly, this difference-in-differences
framework allows us to include firm fixed effects to control more
tightly for time invariant firm and locality characteristics. It also
helps to assuage concerns about endogenous location choice of
(certain types of) firms.
Columns 5 to 7 in Table 5 show the second-stage results. Note that
this sample is much smaller (588 observations versus 24,252) and
covers only 24 region-year-sectors versus 49 when using the repeated
cross-sections. This is partly due to dropping ‘singleton’ observations
where only one firm is observed in a region-sector-year cell. Neverthe-
less, we continue to find negative effects although these are only esti-
mated with precision when we again exclude the largest firms and
focus on the tradeable sector (column 7). It is reassuring that when
using this much smaller panel data set, we find negative impacts of
mining-related business constraints on firm growth that are similar in
size and statistical significance as those derived from the cross-
sectional regressions in the previous columns.
An obvious limitation of the panel regressions in columns 5–7 of
Table 5 is that they are based on small samples (less than a thousandob-
servations).We therefore nowmove to comprehensive firm-level panel
data from Orbis.We download all firms that are present in Orbis for our
nine sample countries and geocode the addresses for firms that exist
(that is, report data) for at least two years during our sample period.
We have to exclude Chile, India, Indonesia and Kazakhstan for lack of
coverage. We drop micro firms and instead focus on enterprises with
at least ten employees to maximize comparability with the BEEPS sam-
ple (and its firm-size distribution). We further need to restrict the sam-
ple to those firms for which we know the status of nearby mines in at
least two years such that the coefficients can be interpreted as
difference-in-difference estimates. This strategy nevertheless dramati-
cally increases our sample size as we can now measure employment
for over 100,000 firms for an average of 5 years.
In our panel regressions we can again include region-sector-year
fixed effects as well as firm fixed effects, effectively measuring the im-
pact of mining by comparing one and the same firm before and after
mines open in its direct or wider vicinity. An important limitation of
Orbis is that these are not survey data and we therefore no longer
have access to firms' own perceptions about the main business con-
straints. We thus move to a specification where we directly link local
mining activity to firm-level employment.
Table 7 provides the results. Fully in line with the results based on
the Enterprise Survey/BEEPS data set, we find robustly that in the di-
rect vicinity of mines, tradeable firms are negatively affected. A one
standard deviation increase in local mining activity is associated
with 5.1 percentage point lower employment for the typical
tradeable-sector firm. In contrast, firms in non-traded sectors as well
as firms upstream or downstream to mines expand employment.
The effect for (downstream) natural resource sector firms is especially
large. However, this appears driven by the largest firms in our data,
because the coefficient no longer can be estimated once we drop the30 Top-5% firms have on average 4,700 employees and the largest ten firms have over
50,000 employees each, whereas the median firm in our dataset has 100 employees.5% largest firms. This also improves the standard error for the coeffi-
cient of tradeable sector firms.
In the 21–150 distance band from firms, we find significant positive
effects for tradeable-sector firms, reflecting the robustness of the previ-
ous results based on the survey data. Non-traded sector firms still ben-
efit but to a lesser degree. The only difference with the survey results is
that the natural resource sector no longer benefits at thewider distance
band.
Overall, also in this large panel sample, we find that negative effects
of mining are local and decay with distance, while positive spending ef-
fects have measurable and significant effects at a wider geographical
scope.
5.4. Robustness: clustering standard errors
Our baseline approach is to double cluster standard errors at
both the country-sector-year and the regional level. In Appendix
Table A5, we show that our baseline results—here replicated in col-
umn 1—are robust to alternative clustering methods. In columns 2
and 3, we cluster by country-sector-year and by country-year, re-
spectively. In column 4, we divide all region-year-sectors into
cells with mining versus cells without mining and cluster standard
errors within each group. In column 5, we cluster at regions defined
by grids of 5 by 5 degrees (550 by 550 km). The grids are defined
within country borders. Lastly, we cluster standard errors by
country-sector-year and by region year (column 6), by country-
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8). In all cases, our results are precisely estimated.5.5. Robustness: cross-country heterogeneity
Since our data set spans nine very different countries, we investigate
in Appendix Table A6 whether our main results—a negative impact of
local mining on nearby tradeable firms that contrasts with a beneficial
impact on more distant firms—are stronger in some countries as com-
pared to others. To do so, we rerun our baseline regression nine times,
each time leaving out one of our sample countries. The size of the esti-
mated impacts may differ across countries for a variety of reasons.
These include geographical differences that make our standard distance
bands less applicable (as distance decay differs) and the size of the ad-
ministrative units over which distribution (if any) of mineral revenues
takes place.
We find that our baseline regressions are remarkably robust across
countries and are not dependent on the inclusion of any one country.
When we exclude China, we findmore precisely estimated negative ef-
fects (that is, improved business constraints) for non-tradeable firms in
the 0-20 km distance band as well as more significant negative effects
(again, business environment improvements) for tradeable sector
firms in the wider ring. Overall, Table A6 therefore indicates that
while the strength of our results differs across countries, both the nega-
tive short-distance and positive long-distance mining impacts are re-
markably common across countries (with both effects less strong in
China).325.6. Robustness: controlling for oil and gas fields
Onemay be concerned that our results are confounded bymining lo-
calities that also produce oil and gas. Oil and gas tend to occur in higher
concentrations of wealth than metals and other minerals, which may
lead to larger local spending effects. On the other hand, production
tends to be more capital intensive and this may imply smaller effects
on local labor demand.
To assess whether our results are sensitive to the local presence
of large-scale hydrocarbon production, we extend our regressions
with the number of oil and gas fields within distance bands of each
firm. We use data from Horn (2011) who reports both the geographic
coordinates and the size of 996 giant onshore and offshore oil and gas
fields (with a minimum pre-extraction size of 500 million barrels of
oil equivalent), of which 293 were discovered in our sample of
countries.31
In Appendix Table A7 we report our baseline regressions while
adding the number of active oil and gas fields (column 1), total oil and
gas reserves (column 2) or the remaining oil and gas reserves (column
3). In each case we include these variables both measured within a
20 km distance of the firm and for a 21–150 km spatial distance ring.
Controlling for giant oil and gas fields does not alter our main result
that nearby mining activity constrains firms in tradeable sectors but
helps firms in the non-tradeable sector as well as firms downstream
and upstream of natural resource companies. We also find that the
presence of oil and gas fields decreases reported business constraints.
However, closer inspection of the data reveals that only few firms
have any oil and gas fields nearby. While there are on average 0.5
mines within 20 km of a firm, there are only 0.01 oil and gas fields
within that distance. In fact, no firms in Brazil, Chile, Kazakhstan, or
Mexico have any fields within 20 km. This suggests that most fields
are in remote regions and that the negative effect is driven by very
few observations.31 Oil, condensate and gas are summedusing a factor of 1/0.006 to convert gas trillion cu-
bic feet to oil equivalent million barrels.6. Conclusions
We estimate the local impact of mining activity on the business con-
straints of 25,777 firms in nine resource-rich countries. We exploit spa-
tial variation in local mining activity within these countries to facilitate
inference in both a cross-sectional and a panel setting. To the best of our
knowledge, ours is the first paper to estimate this impact of mining ac-
tivity on firm performance across a variety of countries. Our results are
clearly at odds with views that consider mines as “enclaves” without
any tangible links to local economies. Insteadwe find strong but hetero-
geneous impacts that differ by sector and distance. We show first of all
that the presence of activemines deteriorates the business environment
of firms in close proximity (b20 km) to amine but relaxes business con-
straints for more distant firms. Importantly, the negative local impacts
are concentrated exclusively among firms in tradeable sectors. In line
with mining-related congestion effects and infrastructure bottlenecks,
the ability of these firms to access inputs, skilled labor and infrastructure
is hampered. This mining-induced deterioration of the local business
environment also stunts the growth of these tradeable-sector firms
and they generate less employment. In sharp contrast, firms in the ser-
vices sector and in upstream and downstream natural resource sectors
benefit from local mining.
In line with our theoretical priors, our results provide evidence
for negative-factor reallocation effects in the immediate vicinity of
mines while we document broad-based net positive effects at a
greater distance. Our results suggest that only traded sector
manufacturing firms suffer from mining, and only at a localized
level, while the non-traded and construction sectors benefit. This
automatically leads to the question about the overall, general-
equilibrium effects at the country level. While our methodology
and empirical findings provide insights into the (heterogeneous)
within-country effects of mining, it is not straightforward to ex-
trapolate from these effects to aggregate impacts at the country
level. In that sense, our findings have little to say about whether
natural resources are a curse or a blessing at the country level.
Making an informed statement about the general-equilibrium ef-
fects of mining would require a quantitative spatial equilibrium
model. Such a model, calibrated with key moments based on our
microdata, would then put empirical structure on the main channels
at work and provide a comprehensive framework to assess how the
local negative effects on tradeables interact with more positive effects
at a larger geographic scale and, finally, nominal exchange rate appreci-
ation effects at the national level. Such an analysis would also need to
account for longer-term labor mobility across regions within countries
and for input-output linkages (and the associated spill-overs) between
non-tradeable and tradeable sectors (and the mining sector in
particular).32 We leave this as an important and promising avenue for
future research.
From a public policy perspective, our results suggest that to mini-
mize localized negative effects on the business environment, policy
makers should ensure that local firms can share the infrastructure that
is privately built as part of the exploitation process. Alreadywhen nego-
tiating infrastructure contracts, authorities can request that new infra-
structure will allow for multiple uses and users. This may reduce the
infrastructure bottlenecks and congestion effects that are apparent in
our data. Improving transport, electricity, water and other enabling in-
frastructuremay not only helpfirms in tradeable sectors but also further
stimulate local services sectors and clusters of downstream and up-
stream industries that are related to mines. To maximize positive spill-
overs, policy-makers can also help firms to become fit to supply local
mining-related supply chains. These measures can help meet theBuilding on Allen and Arkolakis (2014) and Redding (2016), Faber and Gaubert
(2019) develop such a model to assess the aggregate effects of Mexico's ‘natural re-
sources’—that is, its white beaches and archaeological sites—on tourism and the country's
wider economic development.
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long-term impacts.
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Appendix B. . Survey questions
We use the following BEEPS V survey questions to measure firm-
level business constraints. In each case the following answer categories
were offered: No obstacle, Minor obstacle, Moderate obstacle, Major ob-
stacle, Very severe obstacle, Don't know, Does not apply. For earlier survey
rounds and for the World Bank Enterprise Surveys we use equivalent
questions.
Question C.30a: Using the response options on the card, to what de-
gree is electricity an obstacle to the current operations of this
establishment?
Question D.30a: Using the response options on the card, to what
degree is transport an obstacle to the current operations of this
establishment?
Question E.30: Using the response options on the card, to what de-
gree are practices of competitors in the informal sector an obstacle to
the current operations of this establishment?
Question G.30a: Using the response options on the card, towhat de-
gree is access to land an obstacle to the current operations of this
establishment?Question I.30: Using the response options on the card, to what
degree is crime, theft and disorder an obstacle to the current operations
of this establishment?
Question K.30: Using the response options on the card, to what
degree is access to finance an obstacle to the current operations of
this establishment?
Question J.30c: Using the response options on the card, to what
degree are business licencing and permits an obstacle to the current
operations of this establishment?
Question J.30f: Using the response options on the card, to what
degree is corruption an obstacle to the current operations of this
establishment?
Question H.30: Using the response options on the card, to what
degree are courts an obstacle to the current operations of this
establishment?
Question L.30b: Using the response options on the card, to what
degree is an inadequately educated workforce an obstacle to the cur-
rent operations of this establishment?
Appendix C. . Supplementary data
Supplementary data to this article can be found online at https://doi.
org/10.1016/j.jinteco.2019.01.006.References
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